Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000200020008-3 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

| National | Intelligence | Officers |
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| National | Intelligence | Officers |

8 May 1979

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| | MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence | |
| | VIA : Robert R. Bowie Director, National Foreign Assessment Center | 25X |
| 5X1 | FROM : National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE | |
| | SUBJECT : Distribution of Cuban MIG-23 Study | 25X ² |
| !5X1 | 1. Action Requested: Your approval to distribute the attached memorandum to Secretaries Vance and Brown, and Dr. Brzezinski and David Aaron. | |
| | 2. <u>Background</u> : Shortly after the episode involving MIG-23s in Cuba subsided at the beginning of this year, I commissioned a retrospective analysis in depth of Soviet motives in supplying the aircraft and of conclusions the Soviets may have drawn from the US-Soviet diplomatic interaction. David Aaron had earlier complained to Frank Carlucci that we had failed to provide an analysis of Soviet motives. Although the analysis we prepared | |
| :5X1 | for the SCC meeting that was convened to decide on authorizing U-2 overflights was brought to Aaron's attention, Bob Bowie and I agreed that a more comprehensive retrospective analysis needed to be done. | |
| | 3. To do an adequate job on this topic, we needed to have access to the relevant diplomatic traffic, which had not come to this building as a matter of course. At my request Marshall Shulman made the material available to me and to | 25X |
| :5X1 | the OPA/USSR-EE analyst who wrote the attached memorandum. | • |
| | | 25X ² |
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| 5×1 | Upon Removal of Attachment and Caveats this Memo is Downgraded to SECRET | 25X |

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| part of the second | | |
| J. | 4. I therefore recommend that distribution of the attached be limited to Secretaries Vance and Brown and Dr. Brzezinski. A copy should also go to David Aaron who may be regarded as the original requester. The author will be asked to prepare for | |
| 25X1 | wider distribution a version that does not make direct use of NODIS material. | |
| | 5. I have also attached a draft transmission letter to Secretary Vance. If you approve, virtually identical letters would also go to Secretary Brown, Dr. Brzezinski, and David Aaron. | 25X1 |
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| 25X1 | Attachments Memorandum, Draft Letter to Secretary Vance | • |
| | cc: DDCI | |
| | APPROVED: 51900 Director of Central Intelligence | |
| | DISAPPROVED: Director of Central Intelligence | |
| | Date : 14 May 79 | |
| | | |
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| 25X1 | 5,6 - NIO/USSR-EE 7 - OPA/USSR-EE 8 - NFAC Reg. | ٠ |
| 25 X1 | NIO/USSR-EE/ (8May79) | |

Dear Cy,

Shortly after the conclusion earlier this year of our diplomatic interaction with the USSR over the delivery of MIG-23s to Cuba, I commissioned a retrospective analysis of Soviet motivations and calculations in supplying these aircraft to Cuba and of Soviet behavior in response to the US demarches. CIA had already prepared at NSC request a quick-response analysis of Soviet motivations in support of SCC policy deliberations, but David Aaron had asked Frank Carlucci for a more comprehensive analysis.

The attached study was prepared under the direction of the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR-Eastern Europe by

Office of Political Analysis, NFAC. Because this paper makes use of closely-held diplomatic material (NODIS) and continues to be policy sensitive, distribution of the full version is being restricted to yourself, Secretary Brown and Dr. Brzezinski. A sanitized version of this study, excising NODIS material and emphasizing the analysis of Soviet motivations and calculations, is being prepared for somewhat wider distribution.

I believe it will be worth your time to read this paper, particularly the inferences drawn by our analysts about lessons the Soviets may have learned from the US response to the MIG-23 episode.

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Next 27 Page(s) In Document Exempt